Airport Noise: Did the Airport Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979 Solve the Problem by Rockett, Robert J.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 52 | Issue 2 Article 8
1986
Airport Noise: Did the Airport Safety and Noise
Abatement Act of 1979 Solve the Problem
Robert J. Rockett
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Rockett, Airport Noise: Did the Airport Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979 Solve the Problem, 52 J. Air L. & Com. 499
(1986)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol52/iss2/8
AIRPORT NOISE: DID THE AIRPORT SAFETY
AND NOISE ABATEMENT ACT OF 1979
SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
ROBERT J. ROCKETr
THE INTRODUCTION OF jet airplanes into commer-
B.cial aviation in 19591 marked the beginning of an era
of conflict between the aviation industry and airport
neighbors.2 Today, approximately five million United
States airport neighbors reside within areas affected by an
average day-night sound level of sixty-five decibels or
greater.3 The Environmental Protection Agency esti-
mates that noise levels in excess of forty-five decibels are
sufficient to interfere with indoor activities.4 Airport
noise reduces the value of residential real estate in the
area surrounding airports. 5 Additionally, airport noise
1 41 Fed. Reg. 51,522-23 (1976).
2 Werlich & Krinsky, The Aviation Noise Abatement Controversy: Magnificent Laws,
Noisy Machines, and the Legal Liability Shuffle, 15 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 69 (1981).
3 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO ACCELERATE
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFr FLEET MODERNIZATION 10 (1986) [hereinafter cited as
FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION]. A 1979 study prepared for the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) had projected that only 3.8 million airport
neighbors would be subjected to airport noise levels in excess of 65 decibels (dB).
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NOISE EXPOSURE OF CIVIL AIRCARRIER AIR-
PLANES THROUGH THE YEAR 2000 4-17 (1979). The shortfall in the 1979 estimate
results primarily from increased air carrier operations at U.S. airports. FAA, COM-
MERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra, at 10.
4 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NOISE ABATEMENT: POLICY ALTERNA-
TIVES FOR TRANSPORTATION, 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as POLICY ALTERNA-
TIVES]. See also Comment, The 1980 Airport Noise Act: Noise Abatement or Just More
Noise?, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049 (1981).
-1 POLICY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 4, at 130. "[N]oise uses up a real resource
quiet. When noise is 'dumped' on property, the productivity of that property is
affected in absolute and relative terms. Property affected by noise of high inten-
sity is less productive for virtually any use than comparable quiet property, and its
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has a human cost. Human exposure to high noise levels
may cause feelings of annoyance and anger sufficient to
cause ill health in some persons.6 Naturally, airport
neighbors who are subjected to high levels of noise have
sought both political and judicial remedies to their
problems. This comment includes a brief summary of ju-
dicial and legislative activity prior to the Airport Safety
and Noise Abatement Act of 1979, a more detailed analy-
sis of judicial decisions subsequent to 1979, and finally, a
critique of the overall regulatory scheme.
Two events signalled the beginning of extended judicial
and legislative activity that resulted in the current regula-
tory system. First, the Supreme Court considered the is-
sue of redressing injuries resulting from commercial
airport noise in the 1962 case of Griggs v. Allegheny County.7
Second, Congress initiated regulation of airport noise in
1968 by amending the Federal Aviation Act.8 The 1968
amendment authorized the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) to promulgate rules for the abatement of air-
craft noise.9
The Griggs case provides a legal framework that involves
three entities in controlling airport noise. First, the fed-
eral government provides a minimum level of noise abate-
productivity as a housing site may be reduced even more than its productivity as a
site for commercial activity." Id. See also Werlich & Krinsky, supra note 2, at 70.
6 Kryter, Extraauditoy Effects of Noise, in EFFECTS OF NOISE ON HEARING 531-45
(D. Henderson, R. Hamerick, D. Dosnaijh, J. Mills eds. 1976). Annoyance value
of a particular noise varies between different people. Factors affecting individual
response to noise include previous experience, prejudice toward a noise, the star-
tle resulting from a noise and the emotional health of the individual. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 7 PUBLIC HEARINGS ON NOISE ABATEMENT AND
CONTROL 169 (1971) (statement of Dr. John Dougherty). Noise in general living
environment causes annoyance because the noise disrupts oral communications
and prevents sleep. Noise levels of 35 to 75 dB may be sufficient to interfere with
speech communication and sleep, depending upon the duration of the noise.
Kryter, supra, at 544.
7 369 U.S. 84 (1962). See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
" Control and Abatement of Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom Amendment to the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968)(codified as




ment regulation by restricting noise at the source (the
airplane).' 0 FAA regulations require airplanes to meet
certain construction and equipment specifications that re-
duce the level of noise emissions." The federal govern-
ment purports to require noise levels that are
economically reasonable and technologically practicable
while disclaiming liability for unacceptable airport noise. ' 2
The Supreme Court has held that the federal government
assumes no liability for unacceptable airport noise. '
3
The second entity concerned with reducing airport
noise is the local government within the airport vicinity.
However, a pervasive scheme of federal regulation pre-
empts state and local government efforts to regulate air-
port or airplane operations that affect airport noise.' 4
Congress alleviated this problem somewhat with the Air-
port Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979(ASNAA).
The ASNAA provides federal noise abatement grants to
airport proprietors.' 5 These grants are available only if a
noise abatement plan is developed through consultation
with local governments and public agencies.' 6 The con-
sultation process at least provides local governments a fo-
rum for bringing noise complaints to the attention of the
airport proprietor.
Finally, the regulatory scheme recognizes airport pro-
prietors as the third entity involved in reducing airport
10 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2121-25. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 36.5, 150 (1986).
11 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1985). See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
12 14 C.F.R. § 36.5 (1985). The applicable regulations provide;
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)4, the noise levels in this part have
been determined to be as low as is economically reasonable, techno-
logically practicable, and appropriate to the type of aircraft to which
they apply. No determination is made.., that these noise levels are
... acceptable ... for operation at ... any airport.
Id.
IS Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). See infra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
14 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See
infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
15 49 U.S.C. app. § 2103(a)(1)(1982). See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying
text.
16 49 U.S.C. app. § 2103(a)(1)(1982).
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noise. Airport proprietors can exercise a variety of op-
tions to minimize airport noise.17 Airport proprietors also
assume sole liability for damages to airport neighbors
from airport noise.' 8 The most recent Congressional re-
striction of airplane noise emissions, the ASNAA, pro-
vided for a phased compliance with national noise
measurement guidelines.' 9 The compliance period ex-
pired January 1, 1985, so many of the benefits of the AS-
NAA have been substantially realized at the present
time. o
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN AIRPORT NoISE PRIOR TO 1980
A. Cases and Legislation Prior to 1970
In the 1946 case of United States v. Causby,2' the Supreme
Court rejected the common law doctrine that ownership
of land extended to the periphery of the universe.22 In
Causby, United States military aircraft took off from a
nearby airport and passed less than seventy feet over the
top of the plaintiff's house and chicken barn.23 The plain-
tiff alleged that the noise and lights from the military air-
craft rendered the chicken barn unuseable for commercial
chicken farming. 24 The Supreme Court held that flights
over private land so low and frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land constituted a taking compensable under the fifth
11 Id. Airport proprietors are privileged to take any action to abate airport
noise unless the actions are unreasonable, discriminatory or impinge on interstate
commerce. British Airways Board v. Port Authority, 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
18 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 624.
19 Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (1980) (codified in various sections of 49
U.S.C. app. (1982)).
20 Id. See also 14 C.F.R. § 91.303 (1985).
21 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
22 Id. at 260-61. The Court reinforced its holding with the following passage:
"The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea." Id. at 261.
25 Id. at 258.
24 Id. at 259.
COMMENT
amendment.2 5
In the 1962 case of Griggs v. Allegheny County,2 6 the peti-
tioner complained that commercial aircraft traffic from
the Greater Pittsburgh Airport caused noise and vibration
that forced the petitioner from his home. 7 The Supreme
Court considered whether Allegheny County as promoter
and owner of the airport, the air carrier, or the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration should be liable for damages to
the petitioner.2 8 The Court held that Allegheny County
was solely liable for noise related damages noting that the
owner controlled the airport location and the length and
direction of the runways.2 9 The Court further reasoned
that these factors put the airport owner in the best posi-
tion to determine what navigational easements were nec-
essary for airport operation. 0
Increasing air traffic during the 1960's intensified the
airport noise problem and generated congressional con-
cern for protecting the public from the effects of airport
noise.3 ' In 1968 Congress amended the Federal Aviation
Act authorizing the FAA to promulgate economically rea-
sonable and technologically practicable noise standards.3 2
The 1968 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act shortly
preceded an explosion of legislation and litigation as air-
port neighbors scrambled to find relief and protection
from the airport noise problem.
25 Id. at 266. See also Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980); Newton & Slattery, The Changing Areas in Condemnation
Law, 15 URB. LAw. 791 (1983).
2- 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
27 Id. at 85. See also Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise, 30J. AIR L. &
CoM. 207 (1964); Russell, Recent Developments in Inverse Condemnation of Airspace, 39
J. AIR. L. & CoM. 81 (1973).
28 Griggs, 369 U.S. at 89.
Id.
so Id.
'I Control and Abatement of Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom Amendment to
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968)(codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1431 (1982)); see also Werlich & Krinsky supra
note 2, at 72.
' Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra note 31.
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B. Developments Between 1970 and 1979
1. Federal Pre-emption: Can Local Governments Regulate
Airport Noise?
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
local government could legislatively restrict airport noise
in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 33 Plaintiffs
sought an injunction against enforcement of an ordinance
passed by the City of Burbank prohibiting jet aircraft traf-
fic at the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11 p.m.
and 7 a.m.34 The Court relied largely on the legislative
history of the Noise Control Act of 1972 to conclude that
FAA control over airport noise preempts state and local
control. 35 This legislative history also provided a basis for
limiting the Burbank holding to local government regula-
tion of privately owned airports.36
Air Transport Association v. Crotti 37 was the first case to
recognize an airport proprietor's right to control the ser-
vice provided to airplanes using the facility.3 8 Crotti in-
volved a California statute requiring airports to limit the
- 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
54 Id. at 625.
s5 Id. at 633-37. "State and local governments are pre-empted from establish-
ing or enforcing noise emission standards for aircraft unless such standards are
identical to standards prescribed under the Noise Control Act of 1972." S. REP.
No. 1160, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972). The Supreme Court also cited the
legislative history of the Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to Re-
quire Aircraft Noise Abatement Regulation. Burbank 411 U.S. at 635; see also supra
note 31-32. Secretary of Transportation Boyd stated in a letter to the Committee
on Commerce that the Federal Government pre-empted local noise control legis-
lation and that the Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act would expand the
Federal Government's role in the already pre-empted area. S. REP. No. 1353,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968).
.16 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635 n. 14. The Court referred to the legislative history of
the Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to Require Aircraft Noise
Abatement Regulation as a basis for the language that became the airport proprie-
tor exception. Id. "[T]he proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State
or local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations or
establishing requirements as to the permissible level of noise which can be created
by aircraft using the airport." S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968)
(quoting a letter from Secretary of Transportation Boyd dated June 22, 1968).
-' 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975); see also Bennett, Airport Noise Litigation Case
Law Review, 47J. AIR L. & COM. 449 (1982).
s8 Crotti, 389 F. Supp. at 58.
noise exposure of surrounding residential communities. 9
The statute suggested several means of reducing noise,
but the airport proprietor was privileged to implement
the most efficient and effective method.4 0 The Crotti court
reasoned that the right of the airport operator to control
airport use was a necessary consequence of being liable
for damages caused by airport noise.4' The airport pro-
prietor could implement noise control procedures so long
as the methods used were not unrealistic, arbitrary or
unreasonable.4 2
British Airways Board v. Port Authority43 involved an at-
tempt to prevent test flights of the Supersonic Concorde
at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York.44 The court rec-
ognized the Port Authority's right as airport proprietor to
use reasonable, non-arbitrary, and nondiscriminatory
rules to define permissible levels of aircraft noise.4 5 The
Port Authority opposed Concorde test flights even
though the plane was capable of meeting noise standards
that the Port Authority had applied to all other aircraft for
twenty years.46 The court found that the Port Authority
actions were unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory
and dissolved the ban on Concorde flights.4 7
Santa Monica Airport Association v. City of Santa Monica48
and National Aviation v. City of Hayward49 are two California
district court cases that upheld airport proprietor restric-
tions.5 0 The City of Santa Monica prohibited airplane
take offs between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. and imposed a
- Id. at 61.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 63-64.
42 Id. at 65.
43 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), on remand, 437 F.
Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
44 British Airways Board, 564 F.2d at 1004.
45 Id. at 1011.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1011-12.
48 481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
49 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
50 Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. at 940-42; Haywood, 418 F. Supp. at 428.
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noise level restriction on all aircraft using the airport.5 '
The City of Hayward prohibited airplanes exceeding a
certain noise level from taking off between 11:00 p.m. and
7:00 a.m.52 Both district courts balanced the effects of the
respective ordinances on interstate commerce against the
local interest supporting the legislation and ruled in favor
of the local controls.55 However, the Santa Monica court
did strike down an ordinance banning all jets from the air-
port.5 4 The court found that this ordinance discriminated
between jet airplanes and propeller aircraft with the same
noise rating.55
2. Litigation Issues: Causes of Action and Damages for
Landowners
The plaintiffs in Causby and Griggs sought compensation
for a governmental taking of property under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion.56 This type of cause of action, commonly referred to
as inverse condemnation, 57 developed into one of the two
significant avenues for landowner redress from airport
noise.5 8 However, lower federal courts introduced a sig-
nificant restriction on inverse condemnation actions in the
1962 case of Batten v. United States.59
11 Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. at 922-34.
52 Haywood, 418 F. Supp. at 419.
5, Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. at 938-40; Haywood, 418 F. Supp. at 428.
- Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. at 943-44.
55 Id.
58 See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
57 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979) defines inverse condemnation as
a cause of action against the government agency to recover the value of property
taken by the agency though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain
has been completed. Id. When a landowner has been deprived of an essential
element of his relationship to that land by the action of a government entity, he
should be compensated whether or not the government brings an action for con-
demnation. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 313, 391 P.2d 540, 544
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965); see also Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse
Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land
Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15 (1983).
58 See Carroll, Airport Noise Pollution Damages: The Case for Local Liability, 15 URB.
LAw. 621, 628 (1983).
so 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
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In Batten, the plaintiff complained of noise and vibra-
tions from military jet operations that caused windows
and dishes to rattle inside the plaintiffs' home. 60  The
noise occurred not from direct overflights but from en-
gine idling during pre-flight check procedures. 6' The Bat-
ten court held that a taking could occur only if the plaintiff
was actually displaced from space within which he was en-
titled to exercise dominion.62 The court reasoned that di-
rect overflights caused displacement and, thus,
distinguished Causby and Griggs from Batten.63
Federal courts generally follow the Batten line of rea-
soning.64 Also, at least one state court adopted the Batten
requirement that overflights are a precondition of an in-
verse condemnation action.65 However, some other state
courts refused to make the rather insignificant distinc-
tion 66 of whether substantial interferences with property
Id. at 582. The operating procedure involved required planes to idle engines
for about ten minutes on a parking ramp less than 700 feet from the plaintiffs'
property. Id. The planes were then taxied to a warm up pad less than 2,000 feet
from the plaintiffs' property where final pre-flight checks were performed. Id. Fi-
nally, the planes were moved to the takeoff point where engines were advanced to
full throttle. Id. This procedure regularly subjected plaintiffs to noise levels in
excess of 90 decibels. Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 585. The Batten court denied recovery in the absence of overflights by
relying on Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956). Batten, 306
F.2d at 584. The Nunnally court denied an inverse condemnation recovery to a
homeowner who suffered diminution of real estate value from military practice
bombing on adjacent federal land because plaintiff failed to show a physical inva-
sion of the home in question. Nunnally, 239 F.2d at 524.
63 Batten, 306 F.2d at 584.
- Leavell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734, 739 (E.D.S.C. 1964)(noise and
vibration of jet engine testing program at airfield in close proximity to home of
plaintiff did not constitute a taking where there were no direct overflights); Bel-
lamy v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (there is no compensable
taking of property where noise from government jet engine tests cause interfer-
ence with use of residential property where there were no direct overflights and
no total deprivation of ownership rights).
65 Ferguson v. City of Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968), overruled, Sun-
dell v. Town of New London, 119 N.H. 839, 409 A.2d 1315 (1979) (plaintiff failed
to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation for want of allegation of direct
overflights).
- Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 313, 391 P.2d 540, 545 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). "This requirement, that a landowner show a
direct overflight as a condition of recovery is stressed by some federal courts in
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result from direct or indirect overflights.67 Damages in an
inverse condemnation action are limited to diminution of
property values.68
The second alternative for redress against airport pro-
prietors is a cause of action for nuisance. 69  Nuisance
arises from a disturbance of one in possession of his prop-
erty that renders use of such property uncomfortable.70
Initially, some jurisdictions held that federal pre-emption
prevented nuisance recoveries. 7' Even in jurisdictions
that allowed recovery of money damages on the nuisance
theory, federal pre-emption precluded equitable suits for
injunction under the same theory.72 Courts reasoned that
granting injunctive relief under a nuisance theory
amounted to imposing the very type of local regulation
construing a 'taking' .... We are unable to accept the premise that recovery for
interference ... should depend upon anything as irrelevant as whether the wing
tip of the aircraft passes through an inch of the plaintiff's land. Plaintiffs are not
seeking recovery for a technical trespass, but for a combination of circumstances
[caused] by nearby flights." Id.
67 Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn.
1974)(Minnesota court upheld an inverse condemnation action involving land-
owners adjacent to, but not directly under, airport flight path); Martin v. Port of
Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965);
Thornburg v. Port of Ireland, 223 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (holding that the
government is liable for airport activities on its own land that disturb the use of
adjoining lands even in the absence of direct overflights).
- United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. at 256 (1946); see also Martin v. Port of
Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964) (inverse condemnation damages
are measured by injury to market value alone); Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40
Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (municipal airport oper-
ator liable only to the extent the landowner can show a measurable reduction in
market value due to operation of the airport); Adams v. County of Dade, 335 So.
2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate diminution of
property value where value increased due to inflation).
6 Greater Westchester Homeowners' Association v. City of Los Angeles, 26
Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979). See infra notes 74-78 and
accompanying text.
10 See BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 961 (5th ed. 1979).
71 San Diego Unified Port District v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136
Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). The California Supreme Court distinguished
this case in the Greater Westchester case in 1979. The court stated that the interfer-
ence in the San Diego Unified case resulted from the use of federally controlled
navigable airspace and denied a nuisance recovery. San Diego Unified, 67 Cal. App.
3d at 366-71, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 560-63.
712 See Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 371 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
prohibited by the Supreme Court in Burbank.73
In 1979, the California Supreme Court decided Greater
Westchester Homeowner's Association v. City of Los Angeles. 74
The Greater Westchester plaintiffs alleged that noise created
by jet aircraft at Los Angeles International Airport inter-
fered with person to person communication giving rise to
inconvenience, discomfort and emotional distress.75
Plaintiffs sought damages for these injuries under a nui-
sance theory in addition to diminution of property value
under an inverse condemnation theory.76 The California
court held that federal pre-emption did not bar the nui-
sance cause of action. 7 7 Also, the Greater Westchester deci-
sion marked the first instance where a court allowed
recovery for personal injuries in addition to diminution of
property value in an airport noise suit. 78
3. Legislative Actions
While airport neighbors sought recoveries from airport
operators through the courts, Congress and the FAA took
steps to abate noise at its source, the airplane. The Noise
Control Act of 1972 introduced the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) to the regulatory scheme. 79 The
1972 Act provided that the EPA should propose aircraft
noise regulations for FAA consideration.8 0 Although the
Act did not require the FAA to adopt EPA proposed regu-
lations, it did require both the proposed regulations and
I7 d. at 1044; see generally, Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d
812 (2d Cir. 1956)(nonproprietor local government enjoined from enforcing un-
necessary noise ordinance against airplanes flying into John F. Kennedy Airport
because enforcement would necessarily affect flight paths); American Airlines,
Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968)(nonproprietor local gov-
ernment ordinance prohibiting air flights at altitudes lower than one thousand
feet is federally pre-empted).
74 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979).
7-, 26 Cal. 3d at 91, 603 P.2d at 1331, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
76 Id.
77 26 Cal. 3d at 100, 603 P.2d at 1336, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
7 26 Cal. 3d at 100-02, 602 P.2d at 1336-37, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41; see also
Bennett, supra note 37 at 481-83.
71, 42 U.S.C. app. § 4903 (1982).
so Id.
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FAA responses be published in the Federal Register.8 '
This requirement supposedly prevented the FAA from ig-
noring EPA proposals.82
The FAA and EPA collaborated in 1977 to amend the
FAA regulation governing aircraft noise standards.83 The
1977 amendment increased the minimum level of federal
noise protection by reducing the allowable level of noise
emissions for aircraft designed after November 5, 1975.84
In additon to tightening noise emissions standards on
new design aircraft, the FAA promulgated regulations to
limit the noise emissions on the existing carrier fleet.8 5
The new standards required an estimated 1600 aircraft
which were designed prior to 1969 and exempt from the
1969 noise standards to comply with the 1969 regula-
tion. 86  Implementing the required new technology in-
volved a phase-in of quieter aircraft or a retooling of
existing aircraft. The new FAA regulation created a
81 Id.
82 The required publication of EPA proposed regulations and FAA responses
reflected Congressional belief that the importance of noise abatement differed
greatly between the two agencies. Section 2 of the Noise Control Act of 1972,
Pub. L. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972) (stressing the dangers of uncontrolled noise
to the health and welfare of the nation). Congress may have doubted the enthusi-
asm of the FAA in carrying out the legislative purpose because of opinions of the
FAA within the industry. One commentator described the FAA position on noise
abatement as being at best a secondary concern and at worst as serving only the
interests of the air carrier industry. Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L.
REV. 631, 713, 724 (1970).
85 See 42 Fed. Reg. 12,360 (1977). Amendment to Noise Standards Regula-
tions, 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1986).
84 14 C.F.R. § 36.7 (1986). Maximum noise emission levels for airplanes
designed after November 5, 1975, vary between 106 decibels and 89 decibels de-
pending upon the size of aircraft and the number of engines. Id. This noise limit
standard is referred to as the Stage III noise limit. Id. The Stage II noise limit,
which was adopted in 1969, varied between 108 decibels and 93 decibels depend-
ing solely on the weight of the airplane. Id. at Appendix C. See also 34 Fed. Reg.
18,364 (1969) (adopting noise standard regulations codified at 14 C.F.R. § 36
(1985)).
85 41 Fed. Reg. 56,046 (1976) (creating 14 C.F.R. § 91 Subpart E Operating
Noise Limits).
8 Id. The FAA estimated that without mandatory compliance regulations non-
complying aircraft would remain in service as late as 1990. Id.
87 14 C.F.R. § 91.305 (1986). The FAA regulation required each air carrier to
have 50% of its carrier fleet in compliance byJan. 1, 1981 and 100% compliance
byJan. 1, 1983. Id.
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controversy in the air carrier industry because of the cost
of implementing the new requirements.8
Congress passed the Aviation Safety and Noise Abate-
ment Act of 1979 (ASNAA) before the aviation industry
was required to meet the compliance deadlines adopted
by the FAA in 1976 and 1977.9 The ASNAA adopts most
of the technological requirements of the 1977 regula-
tions.9 0 However, responding to industry objections over
the heavy financial strain caused by the proposed FAA
regulations, Congress extended the technology imple-
mentation deadlines. 9' The ASNAA also differs from the
FAA regulation because it provides financial incentives to
encourage airport operators to voluntarily implement
noise controls.9 2 Incentives include eligibility for federal
grants to airport proprietors that submit noise exposure
maps to the FAA.93 Noise exposure maps depict land uses
in the airport area that are incompatible with the noise
levels generated at the airport.94 The ASNAA prohibits
use of noise exposure maps as evidence in noise suits
against airports.95 Also, airport proprietors are relieved
41 Fed. Reg. 56,051 (1976). The FAA published its responses to the airline
industry regarding the cost of implementing the new standards. Without refer-
ring to a specific cost of total implementation, the FAA concluded that the societal
benefits outweighed the cost of implementation. Id.
89 Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94
Stat. 50 (1980) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1982)). The FAA regulations
had provided for implementation by January 1, 1983. See supra note 87.
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 2102 (1982).
91 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2123-24 (1982). The ASNAA extended the most signifi-
cant implementation date from January 1, 1983 to January 1, 1986. Id. See also
notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
92 49 U.S.C. §§ 2103-04 (1982).
I d.
Id. Preparation of noise exposure maps requires an empirical study of noise
levels in the vicinity surrounding an airport. 14 C.F.R. § 150.9 (1986). The infor-
mation obtained from the study is transposed onto a map of the area that shows
noise levels as determined under the ASNAA noise measurement system. Id. The
noise levels appear on the map as contours of noise emanating from the airport.
Id. The map also identifies land uses within each noise contour that are incompat-
ible with the noise level of that particular contour. 14 C.F.R. § 150.11 (1986).
The ASNAA requires airport operators to consult with public agencies and land
planning agencies located in the area surrounding the airport while preparing a
noise exposure map. 49 U.S.C. § 2103 (1982).
w, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2106 (1982).
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from liability to landowners who acquire thier property
subsequent to submission of a noise exposure map. 6
This provision alone portends a decrease in airport noise
litigation. Since many airports have filed or will file these
maps, the number of potential litigants diminishes every
time real property in the airport vicinity changes hands.
Thus, Congress provided a vehicle for reducing the
amount of airport noise litigation. The question remains,
however, whether the level of noise abatement already ob-
tained through litigation, noise source regulations, and
voluntary compliance is adequate.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AIRPORT NOISE CONTROVERSY
SUBSEQUENT TO PASSAGE OF THE ASNAA
A. Judicial Developments
The most significant judicial trend during the first five
years of the 1980's is the mixed response of state courts to
the California Supreme Court decision in Greater Westches-
ter Homeowner's Association of Los Angeles.98 Recall that in the
1979 decision, the California court held that an airport
o1 49 U.S.C. app. § 2107 (1982). The ASNAA states that filing a noise exposure
map constitutes constructive notice of noise levels to prospective purchasers. Id.
However, this provision allows suits for damages resulting from airport layout,
flight pattern or nightime operation changes that occur subsequent to filing of the
noise exposure map. Id.
97 The FAA anticipates approximately 85 airports will have filed noise exposure
maps by the Dec. 31, 1986 cutoff for funding projects under the ASNAA. Tele-
phone interview with Richard Tedrick, Noise Policy and Regulations Branch, Of-
fice of the Environment and Energy, Federal Aviation Administration (January 28,
1986). The original funding cutoff date has been established as Dec. 31, 1985. Id.
As of that date approximately 25 airports had filed noise exposure maps. Id. The
FAA extended the filing cutoff by notice published at 50 Fed. Reg. 7,024 (1985).
Id. The deadline extension was partly necessitated by the ASNAA requirement of
local government consultation in the study. Id. Another factor contributing to the
delay is the fact that the FAA's administrative regulations first published at 46
Fed. Reg. 8,320 (1981) only became final by publication at 49 Fed. Reg. 49,267
(1984). Id. Federal funds pay the expense of preparing a noise exposure map so
the FAA has an excellent mechanism for monitoring which airports are preparing
maps. Id. The cost of preparing a map usually exceeds $200,000 and preparation
of the map takes between one and two years. Id.
Il Greater Weschester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86,
603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980). See also
supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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proprietor could be liable under a nuisance theory for
personal injuries sustained by airport neighbors.99 Courts
in Georgia and Wisconsin havejoined the California court
in holding that federal pre-emption does not prohibit a
nuisance recovery. 00 The Wisconsin court further al-
lowed recovery for personal inconvenience and annoy-
ance despite the absence of a showing of monetary loss.' 0 '
However, not all jurisdictions agreed with the Greater
Westchester decision. In Long v. City of Charlotte, the North
Carolina Supreme Court dismissed nuisance allegations
against an airport proprietor. 0 2 That court stated that in-
verse condemnation is the sole remedy for a landowner
harmed by commercial aircraft overflights.10 3  The Mis-
souri Court of Appeals also held that a pervasive scheme
of federal regulation pre-empted nuisance and trespass
remedies for residents affected by aircraft overflights.10 4
26 Cal. 3d 99, 603 P.2d 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. 738. The holding in Greater
Westchester reflects the opinion of many observers that diminished property values
don't always represent the total cost of airport noise. See supra note 6 and accom-
panying text.
,o- Krueger v. Mitchell, 112 Wis. 2d 88, 332 N.W.2d 733 (Wis. 1983) (holding
that federal pre-emption does not preclude nuisance cause of action against air-
ports operated in compliance with federal regulations); City of Atlanta v. Owen,
248 Ga. 299, 282 S.E.2d 906 (1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1981) (holding that
nuisance and trespass claims arising from operation of airport facility and routing
of flights are not federally pre-empted).
1 Krueger, 332 N.W.2d at 743. The Wisconsin Court upheld a lower court de-
cision allowing recovery for inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort resulting
from an unreasonable and substantial interference. Id. at 735. This case involved
a privately owned airport that was open to public use. Id. The plaintiffs did not
allege any monetary losses or a taking. Id.
102 306 N.C. 187, 293 S.E.2d 101 (N.C. 1982). The City of Charlotte expanded
its municipally owned and operated airport by opening a new runway in 1979. Id.
at 105. Takeoffs and landings passed directly over the plaintiff's home at altitudes
as low as 100 feet. Id. Plaintiffs alleged these takeoffs created great noise and
vibration that disrupted ordinary conversation and physically damaged plaintiff's
home. Id. Plaintiffs alternatively filed actions for inverse condemnation, nuisance
and trespass. Id. The issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff stated a claim for
which relief could be granted on each of the three counts. Id. at 106.
os Id. at 108.
- Drybread v. City of St. Louis, 634 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). The
Drybread plaintiffs were residents of a subdivision in close proximity to St. Louis
International Airport. Id. at 520. Plaintiffs alleged that frequent and continuous
air traffic less than 1,000 feet directly above plaintiff's residence interfered with
the use and enjoyment of property. Id. The plaintiffs sought damages for nui-
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Finally, the Arizona Court of Appeals refused a request
for injunction based on nuisance theories in Northeast
Phoenix Homeowners' Association v. Scottsdale Municipal Air-
port.'0 5 The Arizona holding comports with pre-1980 case
law in which injunctions were federally pre-empted re-
gardless of the theory used.'0 6 The Arizona plaintiffs did
not seek money damages and accordingly the court did
not address the question of whether damages could be re-
covered on a nuisance theory. 10 7
The apparent lesson from the post-1980 nuisance deci-
sions is that inverse condemnation remains the primary
method of obtaining damages for airport noise injuries.
The nuisance theory does have advantages in that recov-
ery might be had for personal discomfort as opposed to
mere property damage.' 0 8 However, some jurisdictions
will not hear nuisance allegations due to federal pre-
emption. ' 0 9
Two significant inverse condemnation cases were de-
sance and trespass, injunctive relief under a nuisance theory, and damages under
an inverse condemnation theory. Id. Plaintiffs appealed after the trial court dis-
missed the two nuisance causes of action. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court decision stating that the plaintiffs could properly recover
for damages under inverse condemnation. Id.
-o5 130 Ariz. 487, 636 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). Phoenix homeowners
appealled from the trial court's dismissal of a request for injuctive relief on theo-
ries of trespass, nuisance, and violation of state statutes. 636 P.2d at 1271. The
Arizona Court of Appeals analogized to City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Termi-
nal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973), which held that federal pre-emption prohibited
local regulation of aircraft operations. Id. at 1272. The Arizona court reasoned
that injunctive relief based on common law and state statutes would also be feder-
ally pre-empted. Id. at 1273. The appellate court affirmed the trial court decision
noting that the plaintiff's claim for damages under an inverse condemnation the-
ory was pending at the trial court level. Id. at 1279.
oo See supra notes 33-37. The FAA is responsible for balancing the interests of
safety, efficiency, and noise abatement in aircraft operations. The Supreme Court
held in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973), that
local ordinances imposing curfews on aircraft flights are pre-empted by pervasive
federal regulation. Allowing injunctions based on common law causes of action
would have the same effect as allowing local curfew ordinances. Northeast Phoenix
Homeowners, 636 P.2d at 1273-74.
107 636 P.2d at 1271. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 637-43 (5th ed. West 1984).
108 See supra note 101.
-o0 See supra note 102-105.
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cided in 1985. The California Supreme Court allowed an
inverse condemnation action against a privately owned
airport in Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Author-
ity. 1 0 That holding expanded the scope of inverse con-
demnation actions which previously applied by definition
only to governmental entities.' In that same case, the
California court held that the plaintiff in a nuisance cause
of action is privileged to choose whether the nuisance was
continuing or permanent." 2 These holdings viewed in
conjunction with the 1979 Greater Westchester"13 decision
seem to indicate a willingess on the part of the California
court to expand the law to encourage recoveries for air-
port noise. 114
In the other recent inverse condemnation decision, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed certification of a class
action for inverse condemnation of avigational ease-
ments.' 15 The Minnesota court found that the plaintiff
110 19 Cal. 3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1985), cert denid, 106
S.Ct.1200 (1986).
- BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979).
112 See supra note 110. A plaintiff may recover only once for a permanent nui-
sance. Baker, 19 Cal. 3d at 868, 705 P.2d at 870, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 297. That
recovery includes both present and prospective damages. Id. A continuing nui-
sance recovery includes only present damages. Id. There is no statute of limita-
tions on filing an action for a continuing nuisance while the statute of limitations
for filing a permanent nuisance action begins running at the inception of the nui-
sance. 19 Cal. 3d at 870, 705 P.2d at 871, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 298. Thus, actions
involving a permanent nuisance that could be barred by the statute of limitations
may be allowed if the nuisance can be classified as permanent. Id. See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 930 (1978).
113 See supra note 98.
114 See generally Carroll, supra note 58, at 629 (prior to 1981 California was the
only state to allow recovery for emotional distress caused by airport noise); Ben-
nett, supra note 37, at 482 (the California court in Greater Westchester expanded
traditional nuisance theory to allow a recovery for emotional distress resulting
from airport noise without a showing of physical injury).
115 Ario v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,640, 17,642
(Minn. 1985). The Minnesota Supreme Court was seeing the Ario case for the
second time. In the first action the court denied a proposed class consisting of
over 27,000 homes, apartments, churches and businesses because the class was so
diverse it lacked commonality. Alevizos, 216 N.W.2d at 668. The Court also held
that inverse condemnation and not nuisance or trespass was the proper remedy
for excess airport noise. Id. The court remanded the case for trial where the
plaintiff sought to certify a new class composed solely of homeowners. Id. Certifi-
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met all the procedural requirements for certification of a
class action. 16 However, the court further stated that
diminution of property value is an essential element in
proving inverse condemnation." 7 Noting that each of
two thousand plaintiffs would be required to individually
prove diminution of property value, the Minnesota court
held that this requirement made class actions inappropri-
ate for inverse condemnation allegations."18
Post-1980 judicial decisions did not drastically alter any
of the pre-1980 case law. The issues pertinent to airport
noise actions remain largely unchanged. The airport pro-
prietor remains solely liable for damages resulting from
aircraft noise."t9 Injunction based on any theory a plaintiff
chooses is prohibited by federal pre-emption.120 Land use
planning remains the sole method for local governmental
entities to abate airport noise.' 21 The various theories for
recovery of money damages have undergone expansion in
some jurisdictions with jurisdictional splits possibly creat-
ing a need for clarification.' 22  However, the Airport
Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979 by its very terms
minimizes the possibility of future airport noise litiga-
tion. 123 The effectiveness of the ASNAA has become the
cation of the new class was the issue presented in the second appeal. Ario, 19 Av.
CAS. (CCH) at 17,642.
116 Ario, 19 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,642. The four prerequisites of a class action
under Minnesota law are (1) plaintiffs so numerous as to makejoinder impractica-
ble, (2) questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) representative parties'
interests are compatible with the class and (4) representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. Id. (quoting Minn. R. Civ. P. 23.01
(1985)).
-17 Id. at 17,644.
118 Id.
119 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Adams v. City of Atlanta,
18 Av. CAS. (CCH) 18,525 (Ga. 1985). See generally Werlich & Krinsky, supra note
2, at 82-84.
120 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
U Gary Leasing, Inc. v. Town Board, 19 Av. CAS. 17,304 (CCH) (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1985) (federal regulation pre-empts Town Board from proposing an airport cur-
few); Treisman v. Kamen, 19 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,872 (N.H. S. Ct. 1985) (upheld
injunction preventing construction of a heliport where zoning ordinance did not
prohibit use of a heliport, but also did not expressly permit the use of a heliport).
122 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. The airports participating in
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dominant issue.
B. Effectiveness of the Airport Safety and Noise Abatement Act
of 1979
A reveiw of the ASNAA effectiveness involves an analy-
sis of three different methods of controlling airport noise.
The three methods include local political action, federal
airplane noise regulation, and local land use planning.
This review was accomplished in part through an inter-
view with Tom Golson, Chairman of the Love Field Citi-
zens Action Committee (LFCAC). The LFCAC represents
people who live and work in the area surrounding Love
Field located in Dallas, Texas. 24 The LFCAC functions
as an intermediary between a variety of neighborhood or-
ganizations, the City of Dallas, and the carriers using Love
Field. 25 The City of Dallas owns and operates Love Field
which was selected for this study partly because it is lo-
cated in close proximity to several large residential com-
munities. 126 As previously noted, residential development
is the land use that is most incompatible with airport
noise.' 27 The following analysis will address both the na-
tionwide impact of the ASNAA and the impact on the citi-
zens living in the vicinity of Dallas-Love Field.
1. Noise Compatibility Planning
One significant aspect of the ASNAA was airport noise
compatibility planning. 2 The voluntary program allows
airports to submit studies to the FAA showing airport
noise patterns and the effects on surrounding communi-
the ASNAA are predominantly those that fear they have potential noise abatement
liability. Telephone interview with Richard Tedrick, Noise Policy and Regula-
tions, Branch Office of the Environment and Energy, Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (Jan. 28, 1986).
124 Telephone interview with Tom Golson, Chairman of the Love Field Citizens
Action Committee (Jan. 31, 1986).
125 Id.
126 Id.
,27 See supra note 5.
12 49 U.S.C. app. § 2104 (1982).
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ties.' 29 Participation in the program qualifies an airport
proprietor for access to federal grants. The ASNAA also
releases participating airport proprietors from liability to
landowners who purchase in the airport vicinity subse-
quent to preparation of a noise compatibility study. 30
Congress provided funding for the noise compatibility
program in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 (TEFRA)."'3 TEFRA increased excise taxes on
fuels used in noncommercial aviation and extended taxes
on transportation of persons by air. 3 2 The revenues
raised by these taxes are appropriated to the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund for funding noise compatibility and
airport development grants.t33
The FAA estimates that approximately eighty-five air-
ports will file noise exposure maps before the grant fund-
ing deadline on December 31, 1986.134  Program
participants primarily include medium size airports that
perceive a risk of future liability.' 35 The main thrust of
noise compatibility planning has been in promoting coop-
eration between airports and airport neighbors.13 6 Fund-
ing of programs goes primarily to acquire avigation
easements while local government entities use city plan-
ning and zoning to promote compatible uses of land in
the airport area. 37 The goal of these efforts is to get peo-
,29 49 U.S.C. app. § 2103 (1982). "[A]ny airport operator... may submit... a
noise exposure map.., which sets forth ... the noncompatible uses in each area
of the map .... a description of the projected aircraft operations.... and the ways,
if any, in which such operations will affect such map." Id.
130 Id.
'' 97 Pub. L. 248 §§ 279-81, 96 Stat. 563, 563-68 (1982).
32 Id.
- Id. at § 281, 96 Stat. 565. The Airport and Airway Trust Fund may be used
partially for acquisition of avigation easements under the noise compatibility pro-
gram. This result effectuates commentators recommendations of federal relief
from the airport noise immediately following passage of the ASNAA. See Werlich
& Krinsky, supra note 2 at 98-99.
1.14 See supra note 96.
I.- Telephone interview with Richard Tedrick, Noise Policy and Regulations
Branch, Office of Environment and Energy, Federal Aviation Administration (Jan.
28, 1986).
1- Id.
1.17 Id. One novel program submitted to the FAA requested funding to
ple away from the airport area. 38 The ultimate success of
these efforts remains to be seen because approximately
seventy-five percent of the anticipated programs have not
been finalized as of this writing.'3 9 Funding of programs
by the Airport and Airway Trust Fund extends through
October, 1987.140
Although the ultimate degree of success for noise com-
patibility planning cannot be discerned at the present
time, certain shortcomings become immediately apparent
in the context of the Dallas Love Field situation. The City
of Dallas and the LFCAC eschewed the federal grants
partly because of fundamental differences between the
program goals and LFCAC objectives.' 4' The program
goal of removing people from the airport vicinity fails to
completely satisfy the needs of the Love Field commu-
nity. 1 42 The large number of people affected by Love
Field noise makes removal of all non-compatible land uses
undesirable at best and perhaps virtually impossible at
worst.' 43 The LFCAC prefers to use land use planning as
just one means of controlling the noise problem.' 44 The
preferable alternative is to minimize relocation of neigh-
borhoods and schools by restricting noise at the source.' 45
The LFCAC considers the federal noise compatibility pro-
gram as an undesirable last resort.' 46 This response indi-
cates that federal noise regulation and local political
action are essential elements to an airport noise solution.
purchase only one of several residential tracts near the airport. The City plans to
convert that tract into industrial use, sell it for a profit, and use the proceeds to
purchase additional tracts. The city anticipates this procedure would continue
until all residental land use is removed from the airport vicinity. This approach
does not appear to be common among noise compatibility programs. Id.
138 Id.
130 Id.
140 97 Pub. L. 248, §§ 279-81, 96 Stat. 563-68 (1982).
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2. Local Political Action
The second piece of the noise abatement puzzle is the
effect of local political action groups on municipally
owned airports.147 The ASNAA requires that the airport
proprietor consult with local public agencies prior to re-
ceiving noise compatibility grants. 148 However, the local
political process is certainly not limited to communities
participating in the federal program. 1 49 The local political
process may be effectively used to persuade municipal air-
ports to change flight schedules, exclude planes that fail
to meet specific noise standards, and prohibit mainte-
nance activities after midnight.15 0 The LFCAC has used
the local political process to successfully solicit promises
regarding noise control from air carriers using Love
Field. '5  These promises primarily involve hastening the
conversion to quieter Stage III airplanes. 152 However, the
promises were obtained only after five years of extensive
lobbying. 53 The LFCAC approach to noise control is in-
tended to accomplish two objectives. First, the LFCAC
believes the carrier will be unresponsive to the noise
problem without some form of mandatory regulation or
economic incentive. 54 Second, the LFCAC believes local
control is preferable to additional federal noise regula-
tions because local restrictions allow airports that are not
noise impacted to continue providing facilities to Stage II
airplanes. 55 Air carriers respond that random local noise
regulations make flight scheduling extremely difficult. 15 6
There is no federal requirement that airport proprietors
select controls that are least restrictive to interstate com-
147 Id.
,48 49 U.S.C. app. § 2103 (1982).
,41 Tom Golson, supra note 124.
150 Richard Tedrick, supra note 135.





1.", FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 3 at 23.
merce. 157 Consequently, some airport segments of the na-
tional air transportation system are shrinking due to
capacity constraints caused by airport proprietor imposed
noise restrictions.15 8 Measuring the aggregate effect of lo-
cal restrictions on national commerce is difficult. 159
These problems indicate that local political action alone
may not be the optimum solution to the airport noise
problem.
3. FAA Noise Regulations
Federal regulations required a mandatory five year
phase in of Stage II aircraft technology.' 6  The five year
phase in period expired on January 1, 1985. Most non-
complying aircraft were prohibited from flying out of any
American airport after that date. 16 ' However, the FAA
granted some insignificant deadline extensions due to
lack of available hush kits. 162 These deadline extensions
expired during 1986.163
The ASNAA also mandated establishment of Stage III
standards. 164  Stage III emission standards are not re-
quired on aircraft designed before December, 1975, but




- 49 U.S.C. app. § 2121 (1982). Stage II 75,000 lb. aircraft are allowed a max-
imum noise emission of 93 decibels. Stage I aircraft had no restrictions on noise
emission. 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1985).
16, 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1985).
16 50 Fed. Reg. 41,327 (1985). Hush kits are noise reduction equipment that
can be installed on four-engine aircraft to enable them to meet the Stage II noise
emission regulations. The FAA granted some limited exemptions from Stage II
compliance because sufficient hush kits were not available. The FAA became in-
volved in a number of lawsuits because of arbitrary and capricious exercise of the
exemption authority. The FAA issued new guidlines for exercise of the exemp-
tion authority which appear to have settled the controversy. Id. See generally, In-
dependent Air, Inc. v. FAA, 19 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,667 (11 th Cir. 1985); Airmark
v. FAA, 19 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,230 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
.... 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1985).
" Id. Stage III aircraft have a maximum noise emission level for a 75,000 lb.
plane at 89 decibels. Id.
'1-5 Id.
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version of the fleet from Stage II to Stage III planes would
have a profound impact on noise abatement.16 6 The FAA
estimates that converting the entire U.S. commercial fleet
to Stage III planes by 1995 would reduce the area of land
impacted by airport noise to thirty-one percent of the area
currently impacted. 6 7 By comparison, if the 1995 U.S.
fleet mix of Stage II and Stage III planes should remain
the same as in 1985, the area of impacted land would in-
crease due to increased air traffic.168 The national air car-
rier fleet is gradually converting to Stage III airplanes. 69
Very few Stage II planes are being manufactured today.
1 70
The Boeing 727, the most popular Stage II plane, has
been replaced by the Stage III Boeing 757 design.
1 7
' Still
the FAA estimates that eleven percent of the air carrier
fleet will consist of Stage II planes in the year 2005.172
FAA experience indicates that old airplanes have been
slower to phase out of operation than forecasting models
estimate.' 73 Older aircraft tend to remain in use longer
than operational efficiency would dictate.
174
The air carrier industry objects to mandatory Stage III
compliance because of the cost of converting to Stage III
aircraft. 175 Converting the commercial fleet from Stage I
to Stage II planes was facilitated by development of re-
trofit technology that modified Stage I planes bringing
them into compliance with Stage II noise standards.
176
No retrofit is available that would modify Stage II planes
16 FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 3, at 5.
167 Id. at 10.
'"- Id. at 12.
... Richard Tedrick, supra note 135.
17o FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 3, at 5.
171 Id.
172 Id. This estimate may be optimistic. The European Economic Community is
considering 1994 as the date to ban all Stage II planes. An EEC ban could dump
a large number of inexpensive Stage II planes into the United States carrier fleet
prolonging the date of total conversion of the U.S. fleet. Id.
173 FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION supra note 3, at 11.
174 Id.
,75 Id. at 20.
176 Id.
to comply with Stage III noise standards. 77 Converting
the carrier fleet to Stage III standards could be accom-
plished only by replacing the existing Stage II planes with
new Stage III models. 78 The FAA estimates that the cost
of replacing all existing Stage II planes would be approxi-
mately forty-two billion dollars. 179 In addition to the capi-
tal outlay, air carriers could lose nine billion dollars on
the premature retirement of Stage II planes. 80 A recent
FAA report to Congress outlined several methods for en-
couraging carriers to incur these expenditures and con-
vert the fleet to Stage III.
The FAA report summarized several alternatives for ac-
celerating fleet modernization.' The FAA made no at-
tempt to quantify the impact of imposing any of the
alternatives,1a2 and limited the alternatives to methods
for which some precedent existed.8 3 The FAA did not
recommend or endorse any of the alternatives.184 The al-
ternatives are summarized below as economic incentives
and regulatory approaches.18 5
a. Economic Incentives
The report refers to proposals that leave operators with
a choice of implementation as incentives. 8 6 The purpose
of the incentive is to alter the market place to make acqui-
sition of quieter Stage III airplanes economically attrac-
tive to operators. 187  Investment tax credits and
accelerated depreciation for Stage III airplanes are eco-
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 9.
,go Id. The loss on premature retirement was calculated by subtracting the pres-
ent value of an airplane's replacement cost in the normal year of replacement
from the replacement cost of the same airplane in 1985. Id. at app. IV.
- FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 3, at 1.
182 Id. at 14.
183 Id.
I4 Id. at 2.
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nomic incentives.' 8 8 The benefits of accelerated deprecia-
tion and investment tax credits are that they require no
direct government outlay of funds, and that they may
make more Stage III aircraft available through leasing
companies to operators who are not in a position to make
large capital expenditures. 89
The proposed Tax Reform Bill of 1986 would alter the
accelerated cost recovery system and investment tax
credit schemes in effect prior to 1986.190 The Tax Reform
Bill would repeal the investment tax credit.' 9 ' It would
also accelerate the depreciation method for assets used in
commercial carrying of passengers and freight by air from
the 150 percent declining balance to 200 percent declin-
ing balance. 92 Accelerating depreciation deductions is
intended to partly compensate for the repeal of the invest-
ment tax credit.19 3 The proposed system is designed to
eliminate tax considerations from investment decisions. 9
4
The primary goal of the new bill is to use reduced statu-
tory tax rates to encourage efficient allocation of re-
sources.' 95 The tax neutrality of the new bill does not
appear conducive to accelerating the acquisition of any
capital asset prior to expiration of the asset's useful eco-
188 Id. at 14-15. Tax benefits are desirable only when an operator has a tax
liability. Many airlines lease aircraft from banks and other entities that are in a
better position to utilize these benefits. Leasing increases the number of available
aircraft. Approximately one-third of the world's fleet is leased. Id. at 15.
-I Id. at 14-15.
190 Id.
191 H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. II, subtit. B, sec. 211 (1986); S. REP. No.
313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1986).
192 H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. II, subtit. B, sec. 201(a)(2). Assets used
in commercial carrying of passengers and freight have a twelve year ADR mid-
point life. Rev. Proc. 83-35, 1983-1 C.B. 745. Assets with ADR midpoints of
greater than four years and less than sixteen years are included in the five year
class for purposes of cost recovery. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 99
(1986). The new tax bill provides that the 150 percent declining balance depreci-
ation method previously in effect for five year property be replaced by 200 percent
declining balance depreciation. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. II, subtit. B,
sec. 201 (a)(2).
" S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1986).
9 Id.
' Id.
nomic life.'9 6 Other methods will be needed to accelerate
replacement of Stage II aircraft. 197
Federal loan guarantees and federal funding of Stage II
retrofit technology are other proposed economic incen-
tives.' 98 Loan guarantees would direct economic re-
sources toward acquisition of quieter Stage III aircraft. 199
Since small new airlines purchase most Stage II airplanes,
a loan guarantee program directed toward these entities
would hasten the removal of those planes from the
fleet.20 0 However, guarantees could also encourage over-
investment by marginal operators °.2 0  That result would
appear to be contrary to the administration goal of achiev-
ing the greatest possible economic growth by encourag-
ing efficient allocation of capital resources. 2
Federal funding for the development of technology that
converts Stage II airplanes to Stage III airplanes is the fi-
nal economic incentive to be considered.0 Development
of similar technology for converting Stage I to Stage II
airplanes was instrumental in that conversion.2 0 4 Devel-
opment of this technology would encourage fleet modern-
ization by substantially reducing the cost to air carriers of
Stage III conversion.2 0 5 Federal participation in commer-
cial enterprises and a substantial commitment of Federal
funds are the main disadvantages. 20 6
b. Regulatory Approaches
Banning Stage II airplanes from operating in the
United States is one potential method of accelerating fleet
modernization. A ban could take one of several forms in-
196 Id.




2 o Id. at 19.
202 S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1986).
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cluding a fixed date ban, an age of airplane ban, or a non-
addition rule. °7 A fixed date ban involves prohibiting
Stage II airplanes that have been in service for longer
than a maximum service life from using U.S. airports.2 ° s
Both the fixed date and age of airplane bans could be lim-
ited by production capacity for Stage III airplanes.20 9
These bans could also have competitive repercussions
due to differing fleet compositions among individual air
carriers. 21 0 The third alternative is Stage II non-addi-
tion.21' Prohibiting addition of Stage II airplanes to the
U.S. fleet would not accelerate fleet modernization but
would prevent introduction of Stage II planes that would
extend the conversion period. 2 12  Air carriers object to
Stage III conversion because of the economic cost of early
retirement of Stage II aircraft.21 3 The FAA estimates the
cost of retiring all Stage II aircraft in 1995 would be nine
billion dollars. 214 That cost decreases to four billion dol-
lars in 2000 and one billion dollars in 2005.215 Implemen-
tation of a Stage II operating ban coordinated with the
useful economic lives of the current U.S. fleet would help
alleviate airport noise and minimize the cost of conversion
to Stage III aircraft.21 6
CONCLUSION
Airport noise and the resulting conflict between the air-
line industry and their airport neighbors are problems
that will never be totally eliminated.21 7 The Congres-
207 Id. at 22-25.
208 Id. at 25.
200 Id. at 24-25.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 22.
213 See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
214 FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION, supra note 3, at 9.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Tom Golson, supra note 124. Even airport neighbors realize the advantages
that the air carrier industry provides a community. Noise is a problem that will
exist in the vicinity of every airport, and will shift from one community to another
every time an airport expands by adding a new runway. The goal sought is to get
[52
sional commitment of federal funds through the Airport
and Airway Trust Fund for airport noise compatibility
planning was an important step in solving the problem.
The ASNAA leaves the possiblity of litigation against air-
ports available to airport neighbors where the airport has
a significant change in layout, flight patterns or nighttime
operations.2 t8 This factor and the local political process
are important components in controlling airport noise.
However, the time has come to implement a mandatory
conversion to Stage III airplanes. The conversion should
be phased in a fashion similar to the Stage II conversion.
The time period for the phase-in should be longer, start-
ing in 1987 with the current fleet average of twenty per-
cent Stage III planes. The required percentage of Stage
III planes would be increased to forty percent in 1990,
sixty percent in 1995, seventy-five percent in 2000, and
finally one hundred percent in 2005.219 The final imple-
mentation of Stage III requirements in 2005 should apply
to both the air carrier industry and to the fleet of noncom-
mercial business and corporate aircraft. 22 0  The long
phase-in period coupled with reduced fuel consumption
and cost savings of Stage III airplanes appear to be suffi-
cient to economically justify the operating ban on Stage II
airplanes.2 2
noise within acceptable levels and to change land uses within the airport area to
be more compatible with the airport. Id. Even if a completely silent jet engine
were feasible, noise caused by the airplane structure moving through air layers
would create noise during take offs and landings. FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MOD-
ERNIZATION, supra note 3, at 13.
2" 49 U.S.C. app. § 2107 (1982).
2- FAA, COMMERCIAL FLEET MODERNIZATION, Supra note 3, at 6.
22"- Id. at 3.
' 2 Id. at app. IV.
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